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experiences of the RAS and PFLP-GC in this regard are similar, as both
Jibril and Basayev enjoyed a tremendously high level of authority within
their respective groups and both had placed a great emphasis on inventing
novel operational methods. So while the communication links within all of
the three innovative organizations studied in this book were by no means
open to the bottom-up approach to innovation, the personal preference of a
powerful leader to take that path had compensated for this absence. The
17N case also confirms this trend  while the internal dynamics such as
Yiotopoulos uncontested leadership and the group s tightly knit structure
were factors that formed a favorable environment for the implementation of
a decision to innovate, the absence of such a decision at the top level pre-
vented the group from doing so. In this sense, the assertion that groups led
by an undisputed leader are likely to demonstrate a greater capability to
innovate successfully, but will only have the opportunity to do so under the
condition that the decision to trigger the innovation process is made at the
highest level, has been confirmed in all of the four case studies. There are
additional examples of the decisive role of the background and desired
image of the respective group s leader as a determining factor behind a
group s emphasis on military operations or a lack thereof. Bin Laden, for
instance, has despite his very limited fighting experience always taken a
special pride in portraying himself as a fighter, as documented by his keen-
ness always to have his Kalashnikov visible in media interviews.571 In con-
trast, SL s Abimael Guzman has always been depicted with a book rather
than a gun and uniform, in concert with the belief that  to wage war it is
necessary to be a philosopher. Comrade Gonzalo s [Guzman s alias] battle
plans are political, not technical. 572 The differences between the innova-
tional trails of group s led by  academics like Guzman and Yiotopoulos on
the one side, and  operatives like Jibril or Basayev on the other is clear.
With regards to the second component of the group dynamics variable,
the assertion that organizations experiencing internal disputes are more
likely to innovate than cohesive groups due to the need to rally their
members behind a spectacular operation was relevant in the PFLP-GC case
and possibly in the 17N case, but not in the other two instances. While the
PFLP-GC s highly contentious nature and a high susceptibility to internal
conflicts and splitting can serve as a viable explanation for its innovativeness,
160 Understanding terrorist innovation
and while the absence of internal conflicts or pressures within 17N could
serve as a partial rationalization for its operational conservativeness, the
absence of this phenomenon in the case of Aum and the RAS makes it
impossible to confirm the hypothesis about the positive correlation between
the need to overcome internal factional disputes and innovative operational
tendencies. And while there have been cases when an organization s imple-
mentation of a new method was specifically designed to strengthen group
morale following internal disputes, a survey of additional groups such as the
LTTE, FARC, AQ, HAMAS, Hezbollah, PKK or PIRA demonstrate that
the record is inconclusively mixed, rendering this component of the group
dynamics variable unusable for threat assessment purposes.
Overall, the lessons of the group dynamics factor show that organizations
led by an uncontested leader who provides a strong drive toward innovation
are the most likely candidates to take this path and to complete it success-
fully. What seems to be the most important implication here is that radical
innovation is likely to be driven by a group s leadership, whose decision is
likely to be influenced by the presence of other critical variables, namely the
attachment to a particular weapon, tactic or the process of innovation itself.
However, Aum s case also demonstrates that excessive obsession with the
leader can inhibit the success of innovation when the group s experts desire
to please a technologically naïve leader becomes stronger than their rational
scientific judgment. This may be yet another reason behind the aforemen-
tioned inverse relationship between a group s desire to innovate and the
ability to do so successfully.
Relationship with other organizations
The next variable relevant to innovation is a group s relationship with other
organizations functioning in the same operational theater. In the event of
cooperation, know-how and technology transfers from one group to another
can take place, contributing to a group s ability to perform a seemingly
sudden capability leap, as we have seen in the case of European left-wing
groups and the impact of the training they have received in PLO training
camps in the Bekaa Valley, or the impact of AQ training on its associate
groups such as JI. Similarly, IRA operatives have gained a high level of
operational knowledge from members of the Greek-Cypriot EOKA, with
whom they shared cells while serving sentences in Wormwood Scrubs Prison
during the 1950s, just as HAMAS employment of suicide bombings can be
traced directly to the training provided by Hezbollah to the exiled Palestin-
ian militants in Southern Lebanon during 1992 1993.573 However, while
examples of operational cooperation among terrorist organizations as a
source of modifications in an organization s modus operandi are abundant, this
variable has demonstrated a limited applicability to the case studies under
scrutiny. There is no evidence that Aum has ever cooperated with any other
terrorist group; and while both the RAS and PFLP-GC certainly have done
Understanding terrorist innovation 161
so, the nature of this relationship was typically in the form of providing ideas,
know-how and training for the other groups, as opposed to receiving it. In
this sense, the interactions of the groups under scrutiny with other organi-
zations hardly contributed to their innovative tendencies in any major way.
Another dimension of the  relationship with other organizations compo-
nent is rivalry among groups active in the same operational theater, which
can result in a fierce competition that can drive each group to improve in
order to demonstrate superiority over its rival. A glaring example of how
organizational competition can drive modifications in a group s modus
operandi can be demonstrated on the contagion of suicide bombings in the
Palestinian context. Following the political success of HAMAS and PIJ the
secular Fatah-affiliated Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades adopted this tactic in 2002
in order to counter the monopoly of both of these increasingly popular reli-
gious groups. This shift was further reflected by the adoption of suicide
operations by other secular groups who in turn compete with Fatah, such as
the PFLP and the DFLP.574 And finally, this trend came full circle with the
Al Aqsa adoption of female suicide bombers, a shift that attracted immense
international attention as well as boosted Fatah s prominence. In order to
counter this trend, both HAMAS and PIJ started adopting female suicide
bombers, despite the fact that such a shift had previously been deemed unac- [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]